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Rosser provability and the second incompleteness
theorem
Taishi Kurahashi
Abstract
This paper is a continuation of Arai’s paper on derivability condi-
tions for Rosser provability predicates. We investigate the limitations of
the second incompleteness theorem by constructing three different Rosser
provability predicates satisfying several derivability conditions.
1 Introduction
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem states that if T is a recursively axiom-
atized consistent extension of Peano Arithmetic PA, then T cannot prove the
consistency of T . This statement of the theorem is somewhat ambiguous, and
it should be stated more precisely. In 1939, the first detailed proof of the sec-
ond incompleteness theorem appeared in their book [8] by Hilbert and Bernays.
They introduced the following conditionsHB1,HB2 andHB3 which are called
the Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions, and essentially proved that if T is as
above and a Σ1 provability predicate PrT (x) of T satisfies the Hilbert-Bernays
derivability conditions, then the consistency statement ∀x(PrT (x)→ ¬PrT (¬˙x))
of T cannot be proved in T .
HB1 : If T ⊢ ϕ→ ψ, then T ⊢ PrT (pϕq)→ PrT (pψq) for any formulas ϕ, ψ.
HB2 : T ⊢ PrT (p¬ϕ(x)q)→ PrT (p¬ϕ(x˙)q) for any formula ¬ϕ(x).
HB3 : T ⊢ f(x) = 0→ PrT (pf(x˙) = 0q) for any primitive recursive term f(x).
Moreover, Hilbert and Bernays proved that Go¨del’s provability predicate
PrT (x) satisfies these conditions. In 1955, Lo¨b [20] introduced the following
conditions D1, D2 and D3 which are called the Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b derivabil-
ity conditions, and proved that if PrT (x) satisfies these conditions, then Lo¨b’s
theorem holds.
D1 : If T ⊢ ϕ, then T ⊢ PrT (pϕq) for any formula ϕ.
D2 : T ⊢ PrT (pϕ→ ψq)→ (PrT (pϕq)→ PrT (pψq)) for any formulas ϕ, ψ.
D3 : T ⊢ PrT (pϕq)→ PrT (pPrT (pϕq)q) for any formula ϕ.
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Lo¨b’s theorem is known as a generalization of the second incompleteness the-
orem. Hence we obtain that if PrT (x) satisfies the Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b deriv-
ability conditions, then T cannot prove the consistency statement ¬PrT (p0 6=
0q) of T . This seems to be the most well-known form of the second incomplete-
ness theorem stated accurately.
Other sets of derivability conditions which are sufficient for the second in-
completeness theorem have been proposed by Jeroslow [10], Montagna [21] and
Buchholz [3] (see also [16]). On the other hand, the second incompleteness the-
orem does not hold for some provability predicates. Feferman [4] found a Π1
formula τ(v) representing the set of all axioms of T in T such that the con-
sistency statement ∀x(Prτ (x) → ¬Prτ (¬˙x)) is provable in PA where Prτ (x) is
the provability predicate of T constructed from τ(v). Notice that Feferman’s
predicate satisfies D1 and D2, but does not satisfy D3 because it is not Σ1.
An example of a Σ1 provability predicate for which the second incomplete-
ness theorem does not hold was given by Mostowski [22]. Let PrMT (x) be the
Σ1 formula ∃y(PrfT (x, y) ∧ ¬PrfT (p0 6= 0q, y)) where PrfT (x, y) is a ∆1(PA)
formula saying that “y is a T -proof of x”. Then ¬PrMT (p0 6= 0q) is trivially
provable in PA. Since the formula PrMT (x) satisfies D1 and D3, it does not sat-
isfy D2. Mostowski’s example shows that for Σ1 provability predicates PrT (x),
the set {D1,D3} of derivability conditions is not sufficient for the unprovability
of ¬PrT (p0 6= 0q).
Rosser provability predicates were introduced by Rosser [24] to improve
Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem, and they are also examples of Σ1 prov-
ability predicates for which the second incompleteness theorem does not hold
([12, 13, 14]). That is, PA ⊢ ¬PrRT (p0 6= 0q) for any Rosser provability predicate
PrRT (x) of T . It follows that each Rosser provability predicate does not satisfy
at least one of D2 and D3. It is known that whether each Rosser provabil-
ity predicate satisfies D2 (and D3) or not depends on the choice of a Rosser
predicate. Indeed, by using Kripke model theoretic method by Guaspari and
Solovay [6], we obtain a Rosser provability predicate satisfying neither D2 nor
D3. Also Bernardi and Montagna [2] and Arai [1] proved the existence of Rosser
predicates satisfying D2, and Arai proved the the existence of Rosser predicates
satisfying D3.
Moreover, it can be shown that the consistency statement ∀x(PrRT (x) →
¬PrRT (¬˙x)) is provable for each Arai’s Rosser provability predicate Pr
R
T (x).
Then Arai’s results indicate that for Σ1 provability predicates PrT (x), each of
{D1,D2} and {D1,D3} is not sufficient for the unprovability of ∀x(PrRT (x)→
¬PrRT (¬˙x)). Also these existence results show that {D1,D2} and {D1,D3} do
not imply D3 and D2, respectively.
The constructions of Rosser provability predicates are somewhat flexible,
and thus actually, Rosser provability predicates satisfying several derivability
conditions have also been investigated ([11, 17, 18]). In this paper, we con-
struct three Rosser provability predicates satisfying several additional deriv-
ability conditions. As a consequence of these constructions, we obtain that
some sets of conditions of provability predicates are not sufficient for some ver-
sions of the second incompleteness theorem. In particular, our second and third
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Rosser provability predicates satisfy the Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions.
Therefore in contrast to the Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions, the
Hilbert-Bernays derivability condition does not imply the unprovability of the
consistency statement ¬PrT (p0 6= 0q) in general.
In Section 2, we introduce versions of derivability conditions, and also intro-
duce some basic results from the paper [16] concerning derivability conditions.
In Section 3, we introduce Rosser provability predicates, and describe back-
ground of the present paper. In the last section, we give constructions of our
Rosser provability predicates.
2 Provability predicates and derivability condi-
tions
Throughout this paper, T denotes a recursively axiomatized consistent exten-
sion of Peano arithmetic PA in the language of first-order arithmetic LA. The
numeral for each natural number n is denoted by n. We fix some natural Go¨del
numbering, and let pϕq be the numeral for the Go¨del number of a formula ϕ.
We assume that 0 is not a Go¨del number of any object. Let {ξk}k∈ω be the
effective reputation-free sequence of all LA-formulas arranged in ascending or-
der of Go¨del numbers. We assume that if ξk is a proper subformula of ξl, then
k < l.
We say a Σ1 formula PrT (x) is a provability predicate of T if it weakly
represents the set of all theorems of T in T , that is, for any natural number
n, T ⊢ PrT (n) if and only if n is the Go¨del number of some theorem of T .
Provability predicates are expected to satisfy some natural conditions which
are called derivability conditions. We introduce three versions of derivability
conditions, that is, local version, uniform version and global version. See [16]
for further details. In the following definitions, let Γ be either ∆0 or Σ1.
Definition 2.1 (Local derivability conditions).
D1 : If T ⊢ ϕ, then T ⊢ PrT (pϕq) for any formula ϕ.
D2 : T ⊢ PrT (pϕ→ ψq)→ (PrT (pϕq)→ PrT (pψq)) for any formulas ϕ, ψ.
D3 : T ⊢ PrT (pϕq)→ PrT (pPrT (pϕq)q) for any formula ϕ.
ΓC : T ⊢ ϕ→ PrT (pϕq) for any Γ sentence ϕ.
B2 : If T ⊢ ϕ→ ψ, then T ⊢ PrT (pϕq)→ PrT (pψq) for any formulas ϕ, ψ.
Definition 2.2 (Uniform derivability conditions).
D1U : If T ⊢ ∀~xϕ(~x), then T ⊢ ∀~xPrT (pϕ(~˙x)q) for any formula ϕ(~x).
D2U : T ⊢ ∀~x(PrT (pϕ(~˙x)→ ψ(~˙x)q)→ (PrT (pϕ(~˙x)q)→ PrT (pψ(~˙x)q))) for any
formulas ϕ(~x), ψ(~x).
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D3U : T ⊢ ∀~x(PrT (pϕ(~˙x)q)→ PrT (pPrT (pϕ(~˙x)q)q)) for any formula ϕ(~x).
ΓCU : T ⊢ ∀~x(ϕ(~x)→ PrT (pϕ(~˙x)q)) for any Γ formula ϕ(~x).
BU
2
: If T ⊢ ∀~x(ϕ(~x) → ψ(~x)), then T ⊢ ∀~x(PrT (pϕ(~˙x)q) → PrT (pψ(~˙x)q)) for
any formulas ϕ(~x), ψ(~x).
CB : T ⊢ PrT (p∀~xϕ(~x)q)→ ∀~xPrT (pϕ(~˙x)q) for any formula ϕ(~x).
Definition 2.3 (Global derivability conditions).
D2G : T ⊢ ∀x∀y(PrT (x→˙y)→ (PrT (x)→ PrT (y))).
D3G : T ⊢ ∀x(PrT (x)→ PrT (pPrT (x˙)q)).
ΓCG : T ⊢ ∀x(TrueΓ(x)→ PrT (x)).
Here pϕ(~˙x)q is an abbreviation for pϕ(x˙0, . . . , x˙k−1)q which is a primitive
recursive term corresponding to a primitive recursive function calculating the
Go¨del number of ϕ(n0, . . . , nk−1) from n0, . . . , nk−1. Also x→˙y is a primitive
recursive term such that PA ⊢ pϕq→˙pψq = pϕ → ψq for all formulas ϕ and
ψ. Furthermore TrueΓ(x) is a natural formula defining the truth of Γ sentences
(cf. Ha´jek and Pudla´k [7]).
Notice that every provability predicate automatically satisfies D1. Since our
provability predicates are Σ1, D3 is a particular case of Σ1C. Also D3
U and
D3G are particular cases of Σ1C
U. The condition CB claims the provability
of sentences corresponding to the Converse Barcan Formula (see [9]). It is easy
to prove the following implications (see [16]).
Proposition 2.4.
1. ∆0C and B2 ⇒ D1.
2. ∆0C
U and B2 ⇒ D1
U.
3. D1 and D2⇒ B2.
4. D1U and D2U ⇒ BU
2
.
5. D1 and CB⇒ D1U.
6. BU
2
⇒ CB.
Here the first clause of Proposition 2.4 means that for any Σ1 formula PrT (x),
if PrT (x) satisfies both ∆0C and B2, then it also satisfies D1.
Moreover, the following nontrivial implication holds.
Theorem 2.5 (Kurahashi [16]). D1 and BU2 ⇒ Σ1C
U.
By Proposition 2.4.4, we immediately obtain the following corollary which
is due to Buchholz (see also [23]).
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Corollary 2.6 (Buchholz [3]). D1U and D2U ⇒ Σ1C
U.
We introduce several different consistency statements based on the provabil-
ity predicate PrT (x).
Definition 2.7.
• ConHPrT :≡ ∀x(PrT (x)→ ¬PrT (¬˙x)).
• ConLPrT :≡ ¬PrT (p0 6= 0q).
• For each formula ϕ, ConPrT (ϕ) :≡ (PrT (pϕq)→ ¬PrT (p¬ϕq)).
• ConSPrT := {ConPrT (ϕ) : ϕ is a formula}.
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Here ¬˙x is a primitive recursive term satisfying PA ⊢ ¬˙pϕq = p¬ϕq for any
formula ϕ. Then for every formula ϕ, ConPrT (ϕ) follows from Con
H
PrT
. Also
Con
L
PrT
follows from ConPrT (0 = 0) because PrT (x) satisfies D1. Therefore we
have that ConHPrT is stronger than Con
S
PrT
, and ConSPrT is stronger than Con
L
PrT
.
In general, the converse implications do not hold.
Hilbert and Bernays introduced the conditions HB1, HB2 and HB3 de-
scribed in the introduction which are sufficient for unprovability of ConHPrT . In
our context, each of their conditions correponds to B2, CB and ∆0C
U, respec-
tively. Then we call the conditions B2, CB and ∆0C
U the Hilbert-Bernays
derivability conditions. Their result can be stated as follows (see [16]).
Theorem 2.8 (Hilbert and Bernays [8]). If PrT (x) satisfies B2, CB and
∆0C
U, then T 0 ConHPrT .
The following theorem is a well-known form of unprovability of consistency
which is essentially due to Lo¨b. The conditions D1, D2 and D3 are called the
Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions.
Theorem 2.9 (Lo¨b [20]). If PrT (x) satisfies D1, D2 andD3, then T 0 Con
L
PrT
.
By Proposition 2.4.3, {D1,D2} implies {D1,B2}. In [16], it is proved that
if PrT (x) satisfies D1, B2 and D3, then T 0 Con
H
PrT
. This statement can be
strengthened as follows.
Theorem 2.10. If PrT (x) satisfies D1, B2 and D3, then T 0 Con
S
PrT
.2
Proof. Suppose PrT (x) satisfies D1, B2 and D3. Let ϕ be any sentence satis-
fying T ⊢ ϕ↔ ¬PrT (pϕq). Then we have T ⊢ ConPrT (ϕ)→ ϕ as in [16]. Since
T 0 ϕ, T 0 ConPrT (ϕ). Thus T 0 Con
S
PrT
.
Notice that if PrT (x) satisfies D2, then Con
S
PrT
follows from ConLPrT . Hence
Theorem 2.9 is also a consequence of Theorem 2.10.
1Introducing this schematic consistency statement ConS
PrT
was proposed by the referee.
2This means that T 0 ConPrT (ϕ) for some formula ϕ.
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In his proof of the incompleteness theorems, Go¨del constructed a ∆1(PA) for-
mula ProofT (x, y) saying that y is the Go¨del number of a T -proof of a formula
with the Go¨del number x. Go¨del’s provability predicate ProvT (x) is defined
as ∃yProofT (x, y). Then the formula ProvT (x) is a Σ1 provability predicate
satisfying full derivability conditions D1U, D2G and Σ1C
G. Thus the sen-
tence ConL
ProvT
is not provable in T by Theorem 2.9. This is Go¨del’s second
incompleteness theorem. It is known that ConH
ProvT
and ConL
ProvT
are provably
equivalent in PA (see [16]), and so let ConT denote one of these consistency
statements.
Theorem 2.11 (The second incompleteness theorem (Go¨del [5])). The consis-
tency statement ConT of T cannot be proved in T .
3 Rosser provability predicates
In this section, we introduce Rosser provability predicates and survey on deriv-
ability conditions for Rosser provability predicates. We say a formula PrfT (x, y)
is a proof predicate of T if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. Prf(x, y) is ∆1(PA);
2. PA ⊢ ∀x(ProvT (x)↔ ∃yPrfT (x, y));
3. for any natural number n and formula ϕ, N |= ProofT (pϕq, n)↔ PrfT (pϕq, n);
4. PA ⊢ ∀x∀x′∀y(PrfT (x, y) ∧ PrfT (x
′, y)→ x = x′).
The last clause means that our proof predicates are single-conclusion ones.
For each proof predicate PrfT (x, y) of T , we can associate the Σ1 formula
∃y(PrfT (x, y) ∧ ∀z ≤ y¬PrfT (¬˙x, z))
which is said to be the Rosser provability predicate of PrfT (x, y) or a Rosser
provability predicate of T . Notice that every Rosser provability predicate of T
is a Σ1 provability predicate of T .
Rosser provability predicates were essentially introduced by Rosser [24] to
improve Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem. The following proposition is an
important feature of Rosser provability predicates.
Proposition 3.1. Let PrRT (x) be any Rosser provability predicate of T and ϕ
be any formula. If T ⊢ ¬ϕ, then PA ⊢ ¬PrRT (pϕq).
Since T proves ¬0 6= 0, PA ⊢ ¬PrRT (p0 6= 0q) by Proposition 3.1. Thus we
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. For any Rosser provability predicate PrRT (x) of T , PA ⊢
Con
L
PrR
T
.
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There are limitations of the existence of Rosser provability predicates sat-
isfying certain derivability conditions. From Theorem 2.9 and Proposition 3.2,
we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3. There exists no Rosser provability predicate of T satisfying both
D2 and D3.
The following proposition is implicitly stated in Jeroslow [10] without a
proof.
Proposition 3.4. There exists no Rosser provability predicate of T satisfying
Σ1C.
Proof. Let PrRT (x) be the Rosser provability predicate of a proof predicate
PrfT (x, y). Let σ be a Σ1 sentence satisfying the following equivalence:
PA ⊢ σ ↔ ∃x(PrfT (p¬σq, x) ∧ ∀y < x¬PrfT (pσq, y)).
Then PA ⊢ PrRT (pσq) → ¬σ. If T ⊢ σ → Pr
R
T (pσq), then T ⊢ σ → ¬σ, and
hence T ⊢ ¬σ. Then N |= σ by the choice of σ. By Σ1-completeness, T ⊢ σ.
This is a contradiction. We conclude T 0 σ → PrRT (pσq).
Then by Proposition 3.4, Theorem 2.5 and Corollary 2.6, we obtain the
following corollary.
Corollary 3.5.
1. There exists no Rosser provability predicate of T satisfying BU2 .
2. There exists no Rosser provability predicate of T satisfying both D1U and
D2U.
Kreisel and Takeuti [15] asked whether Rosser provability predicates satisfy
D2 or not. Guaspari and Solovay established a modal logical method of obtain-
ing Rosser provabilty predicates without some certain conditions. From their
method, we have:
Theorem 3.6 (Guaspari and Solovay [6]). There exist Rosser provability pred-
icates satisfying neither D2 nor D3.
Notice that Guaspari and Solovay’s Rosser provability predicates are based
on multi-conclusion proof predicates, and Shavrukov [25] proved the same result
for Rosser provability predicates based on single-conclusion proof predicates.
The Rosser provability predicate of Go¨del’s proof predicate ProofT (x, y) is
denoted by ProvRT (x). Montagna [21] proved that the global version of D2 does
not hold for ProvRT (x).
Proposition 3.7 (Montagna [21]). The Rosser provability predicate ProvRT (x)
does not satisfy D2G.
On the other hand, there are Rosser provability predicates satisfying some
derivability conditions.
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Theorem 3.8 (Bernardi and Montagna [2]; Arai [1]). There exist Rosser prov-
ability predicates satisfying D2G.
The existence of Rosser provability predicates satisfying D2 was also men-
tioned in Shavrukov [25]. Kikuchi and Kurahashi [11] investigated Rosser prov-
ability predicates satisfying D2 and an additional certain condition. Kurahashi
[17] investigated provability logics of Rosser provability predicates satisfying
D2.
The existence of Rosser provability predicates satisfying D3 was proved by
Arai.
Theorem 3.9 (Arai [1]). There exist Rosser provability predicates satisfying
D3G.
Arai proved Theorems 3.8 and 3.9 under the assumption that formulas
are formulated in negation normal form. Let nnf(ϕ) be one of negation nor-
mal forms of a formula ϕ such that nnf(¬¬ϕ) ≡ nnf(ϕ). Then we can un-
derstand that Arai’s Rosser provability predicates are defined as PrRT (x) ≡
∃y(PrfT (nnf(x), y) ∧ ∀z ≤ y¬PrfT (nnf(¬˙x), z)). Then it is easy to see that
PA ⊢ ConH
PrR
T
. Thus strictly speaking, from this point of view, Arai’s Rosser
provability predicates are different from ours. Notice that his proofs are appli-
cable to our Rosser provability predicates with some modifications. In fact, our
proof of Theorem 4.1 (resp. Theorem 4.3) improves Theorem 3.8 (resp. Theorem
3.9), and our proofs of these theorems are based on Arai’s proofs.
Moreover, Arai’s results indicate that neither {D1,D2G} nor {D1,D3G} is
sufficient for the unprovability of the consistency statement ConHPrT . By Corol-
laries 3.3 and 3.5, {D1,D2G} implies neither D3 nor D1U. A similar observa-
tion can be done for {D1,D3G}, and then we obtain the following corollary on
non-implications concerning derivability conditions and the second incomplete-
ness theorem.
Corollary 3.10.
1. {D1,D2G} does not imply any of D1U, D3 or T 0 ConHPrT .
2. {D1,D3G} does not imply any of B2, Σ1C or T 0 Con
H
PrT
.
For example, the first clause of this corollary means that there exists a Σ1
provability predicate PrT (x) satisfying D1 and D2
G, and not enjoying any of
D1U, D3 or T 0 ConHPrT .
In this paper, we improve Theorems 3.8 and 3.9 by showing the existence
of Rosser provability predicates satisfying more additional conditions. As a
corollary to our results, we obtain several more non-implications.
4 Main Theorems
In this section, we prove three theorems which are main theorems of this paper.
The first theorem is an improvement of Theorem 3.8.
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Theorem 4.1. There exists a Rosser provability predicate of T satisfying D2G,
∆0C
G and PA ⊢ ConHPrR
1
. That is, there exists a Rosser provability predicate
PrR1 (x) of T satisfying the following conditions:
1. PA ⊢ ∀x∀y(PrR1 (x→˙y)→ (Pr
R
1 (x)→ Pr
R
1 (y))).
2. PA ⊢ ∀x(True∆0(x)→ Pr
R
1 (x)).
3. PA ⊢ ∀x(PrR1 (x)→ ¬Pr
R
1 (¬˙x)).
The second theorem shows that in the statement of Corollary 2.6, the con-
dition D2U cannot be replaced by D2.
Theorem 4.2. There exists a Rosser provability predicate of T satisfying CB,
D2 and ∆0C
G. That is, there exists a Rosser provability predicate PrR2 (x) of
T satisfying the following conditions:
1. T ⊢ PrR2 (p∀~xϕ(~x)q)→ ∀~xPr
R
2 (pϕ(~˙x)q) for any formula ϕ(~x).
2. T ⊢ PrR2 (pϕ → ψq) → (Pr
R
2 (pϕq) → Pr
R
2 (pψq)) for any formulas ϕ and
ψ.
3. PA ⊢ ∀x(True∆0(x)→ Pr
R
2 (x)).
The last theorem is an improvement of Theorem 3.9.
Theorem 4.3. There exists a Rosser provability predicate of T satisfying CB,
B2, D3
G and∆0C
G. That is, there exists a Rosser provability predicate PrR3 (x)
of T satisfying the following conditions:
1. T ⊢ PrR3 (p∀~xϕ(~x)q)→ ∀~xPr
R
3 (pϕ(~˙x)q) for any formula ϕ(~x).
2. For any formulas ϕ and ψ, if T ⊢ ϕ → ψ, then T ⊢ PrR3 (pϕq) →
PrR3 (pψq).
3. PA ⊢ ∀x(PrR3 (x)→ Pr
R
3 (pPr
R
3 (x˙)q)).
4. PA ⊢ ∀x(True∆0(x)→ Pr
R
3 (x)).
Remark 4.4. Notice that both of PrR2 (x) and Pr
R
3 (x) satisfy the Hilbert-
Bernays derivability conditions B2, CB and ∆0C
U. Thus by Theorem 2.8,
T can prove neither ConH
PrR
2
nor ConH
PrR
3
. Therefore our Theorems 4.2 and 4.3
cannot be proved under Arai’s assumption that formulas are formulated in nega-
tion normal form. Moreover, since PrR3 (x) satisfies B2 and D3, T 0 Con
S
PrR
3
by
Theorem 2.10.
By Proposition 3.2, T proves ConL
PrR
2
and ConL
PrR
3
. Since PrR2 (x) satisfiesD2,
T can also prove ConS
PrR
2
. Therefore our Rosser provability predicates PrR2 (x)
and PrR3 (x) indicate the difference of the unprovability of three consistency
statements ConHPrT , Con
S
PrT
and ConLPrT . The following table summarizes the
situation of the unprovability of consistency statements.
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T ⊢ ConHPrT T ⊢ Con
S
PrT
T ⊢ ConLPrT
PrR1 (x) Yes Yes Yes
PrR2 (x) No Yes Yes
PrR3 (x) No No Yes
We obtain the following corollary for provability predicates.
Corollary 4.5.
1. {D1,D2G,∆0C
G} does not imply any of D1U, D3 or T 0 ConHPrT .
2. {D1,CB,D2,∆0C
G} does not imply any of D2U, D3 or T 0 ConSPrT .
3. {D1,CB,B2,D3
G,∆0C
G} does not imply any of D2, Σ1C or T 0
Con
L
PrT
.
Corollary 4.5 shows that ConHPrT and Con
S
PrT
cannot be replaced by ConSPrT
and ConLPrT in the statements of Theorems 2.8 and 2.10, respectively.
Remark 4.6. Since the set of all ∆0 sentences are closed under negation, PA ⊢
∀x(∆0(x) ∧ ¬True∆0(x) → True∆0(¬˙x)) where ∆0(x) is a formula naturally
representing the set of all ∆0 sentences. By ∆0C
G for PrR1 (x), we have that
PA ⊢ ∀x(∆0(x) ∧ ¬True∆0(x)→ Pr
R
1 (¬˙x)). Since Con
H
PrR
1
is provable in PA, we
obtain PA ⊢ ∀x(∆0(x) ∧ ¬True∆0(x) → ¬Pr
R
1 (x)). Therefore the uniform ∆0
reflection principle ∀x(∆0(x) ∧ Pr
R
1 (x) → True∆0(x)) for Pr
R
1 (x) is provable in
PA.3
Before proving our results, we introduce some terminology and prove a
lemma. We assume that our logical symbols are only ∧,¬ and ∀, and other
logical symbols such as → and ∃ are introduced as abbreviations. We say a for-
mula ϕ′ is an instance of a formula ϕ if for some numbers k, i0, . . . , ik−1, some
variables x0, . . . , xk−1 and some formula ψ, the formulas ϕ and ϕ
′ are of the
forms ∀x0 · · · ∀xk−1ψ(x0, . . . , xk−1) and ψ(i0, . . . , ik−1), respectively. For each
natural number m, let Fm be the set of all formulas whose Go¨del numbers are
less than or equal to m. We say that a finite mapping V : Fm → {0, 1} is a
truth assignment on Fm if V satisfies the usual conditions of truth assignments
for propositional logic such as V (ϕ∧ψ) = V (ϕ) ·V (ψ), V (¬ϕ) = 1−V (ϕ), and
so on. Let X be any finite set of formulas. Let d(X) = min{n′ : X ⊆ Fn′}. A
truth assignment V on Fm is said to be a model of X if d(X) ≤ m and V (ϕ) = 1
for all ϕ ∈ X . Let PT,m be the finite set {ϕ : N |= ∃y ≤ mProofT (pϕq, y)} of
formulas.
We introduce two conditions (A) and (B) about truth assignments V on Fm.
• (A): For any formulas ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ Fm, if V (ϕ) = 1 and ϕ
′ is an instance of ϕ,
then V (ϕ′) = 1.
3This is pointed out by the referee.
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• (B): If ϕ ∈ Fm is a ∆0 sentence, then ϕ is true if and only if V (ϕ) = 1.
The above terminology and definitions are formalizable in PA. Then we
can define a ∆1(PA) formula Sat(u) saying that “there exists a model of PT,u
satisfying the conditions (A) and (B)” by using the ∆1(PA) formula True∆0(x).
We prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.7. PA ⊢ ConT ↔ ∀uSat(u).
Proof. We reason in PA.
(←): Suppose ¬ConT , then there exists a numberm such that PT,m contains
both 0 = 0 and 0 6= 0. Obviously PT,m has no model. Therefore ¬Sat(m) holds
for some m.
(→): Suppose ConT . Then there is a definable complete consistent extension
T ′ of T by the arithmetized completeness theorem (cf. Ha´jek and Pudla´k [7]).
Let m be any number. We define a finite mapping V : Fm → {0, 1} as follows:
for every ϕ ∈ Fm, V (ϕ) = 1 if and only if ϕ ∈ T
′. Since T ′ is complete and
consistent, V is a truth assignment on Fm.
We prove that V satisfies the condition (A). Let ϕ and ϕ′ be any formulas
in Fm with V (ϕ) = 1 and ϕ
′ is an instance of ϕ. Then ϕ ∈ T ′. Since ϕ→ ϕ′ is
logically valid, ϕ′ ∈ T ′. Therefore V (ϕ′) = 1.
We prove that V satisfies the condition (B). Let ϕ ∈ Fm be any ∆0 sentence.
If ϕ is true, then ϕ is provable in T by ∆0C
G for ProvT (x). Thus ϕ ∈ T
′ and
hence V (ϕ) = 1. If ϕ is false, then ¬ϕ is a true ∆0 sentence and is provable in
T . By the consistency of T ′, ϕ /∈ T ′. Therefore V (ϕ) = 0.
Also since T ′ is an extension of T , V is a model of PT,m. We conclude that
Sat(m) holds.
Notice that PA is essentially reflexive, that is, every consistent extension of
PA can prove the consistency of every finite subtheory of itself (cf. [19]). Thus
in a similar way as in our proof of Lemma 4.7, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4.8. For every natural number m, T ⊢ Sat(m).
4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 4.1. For each formula ϕ, we define the
formula −ϕ as follows:
−ϕ :≡
{
ϕ if ϕ is not of the form ¬ψ,
ψ if ϕ is of the form ¬ψ.
Let {ξk}k∈ω be the effective enumeration of all formulas introduced in Sec-
tion 2. Notice that if ξk is −ξl, then ξk is a subformula of ξl, and hence k ≤ l.
Therefore ξk is none of −ξl for all l < k. This property will be used in our
proofs.
We define a primitive recursive function e(ϕ, V, n) as follows:
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• If V is not a (code of) truth assignment on Fn, e(ϕ, V, n) = 0.
• If V is a truth assignment on Fn, then the value of e(ϕ, V, n) is defined as
follows by recursion on the construction of ϕ:
1. If ϕ is an atomic formula or a universal formula,
e(ϕ, V, n) :=


V (ϕ) if ϕ ∈ Fn,
1 if ϕ /∈ Fn & ϕ is a true ∆0 sentence,
0 if ϕ /∈ Fn & ϕ is a false ∆0 sentence,
1 otherwise.
2. If ϕ is ¬ξ0, then e(ϕ, V, n) := 1− e(ξ0, V, n).
3. If ϕ is ξ0 ∧ ξ1, then e(ϕ, V, n) := e(ξ0, V, n) · e(ξ1, V, n).
Then it can be proved that if V is a truth assignment on Fn, then for any
formula ϕ ∈ Fn, V (ϕ) = e(ϕ, V, n).
Here we state Theorem 4.1 again.
Theorem 4.1. There exists a Rosser provability predicate PrR1 (x) of T satisfy-
ing the following conditions:
1. PA ⊢ ∀x∀y(PrR1 (x→˙y)→ (Pr
R
1 (x)→ Pr
R
1 (y))).
2. PA ⊢ ∀x(True∆0(x)→ Pr
R
1 (x)).
3. PA ⊢ ∀x(PrR1 (x)→ ¬Pr
R
1 (¬˙x)).
Proof. We define a PA-provably recursive function g1(x) in stages. Let Prf1(x, y)
be the ∆1(PA) formula x = g1(y) ∧ Fml(x), where Fml(x) is a natural ∆1(PA)
formula saying that x is a formula. Let PrR1 (x) be the Rosser provability pred-
icate of Prf1(x, y). The definition of g1 consists of Procedures 1 and 2. The
definition of g1 begins with Procedure 1, and enumerates theorems of T until
appearing a number m such that Sat(m) does not hold. After appearing such
a number m, the definition of g1 shifts to Procedure 2. In Procedure 2, g1
outputs all formulas in stages. In the definition of the function g1, we identify
each formula with its Go¨del number.
Procedure 1.
Stage 1.m:
• If Sat(m), then
g1(m) =
{
ϕ if m is a proof of ϕ in T, that is, ProofT (ϕ,m) holds,
0 m is not a proof of any formula in T.
Go to Stage 1.(m+ 1).
• If ¬Sat(m), then go to Procedure 2.
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Procedure 2.
Let m be the least number such that Sat(m) does not hold. Since Sat(m − 1)
holds, there exists a model of PT,m−1 satisfying the condition (B). Let V be the
least such model. Let n = d(PT,m−1), then V is defined on Fn.
We define the value g1(m+ k) for k ≥ 0 as follows:
g1(m+ k) =
{
−ξk if e(ξk, V, n) = 1,
¬ξk if e(ξk, V, n) = 0.
The definition of the function g1 is completed.
First, we show that the formula Prf1(x, y) is a proof predicate of T . Since
∀uSat(u) is true in the standard model N by Lemma 4.7, N |= ProofT (pϕq, n)↔
Prf1(pϕq, n) for all ϕ and n by the definition of g1. Also PA ⊢ ∀x∀x
′∀y(Prf1(x, y)∧
Prf1(x
′, y)→ x = x′) trivially holds. We show that the sentence ∀x(ProvT (x)↔
∃yPrf1(x, y)) is provable in PA. By the definition of g1, this sentence is obvi-
ously proved in PA+∀uSat(u). It suffices to show that this sentence is provable
in PA+ ∃u¬Sat(u).
We proceed in PA+∃u¬Sat(u): Let m be the least number such that Sat(m)
does not hold, and let n = d(PT,m−1). Let V be the least model of PT,m−1
satisfying (B). We show that for any k, g1 eventually outputs the formula ξk.
We distinguish the following three cases.
• e(ξk, V, n) = 1 and ξk is not of the form ¬ψ: Then g1(m+ k) = −ξk = ξk.
• e(ξk, V, n) = 1 and ξk is of the form ¬ξl: Then e(ξl, V, n) = 0 and g1(m+
l) = ¬ξl = ξk.
• e(ξk, V, n) = 0: Then for p with ¬ξk = ξp, e(ξp, V, n) = 1 and hence
g1(m+ p) = −ξp = ξk.
We have shown that ∃yPrf1(x, y) holds if and only if x is a formula. Since
¬ConT holds by Lemma 4.7, x is provable in T if and only if x is a formula.
Therefore ∀x(ProvT (x)↔ ∃yPrf1(x, y)) holds.
Next, we show that our formula PrR1 (x) satisfies the required conditions.
The following claim is a key property of our construction of PrR1 (x).
Claim 1. The following sentence is provable in PA: “Let m be the least
number such that Sat(m) does not hold, let n = d(PT,m−1) and let V be the
least model of PT,m−1 satisfying (B). Then for any formula ϕ,
e(ϕ, V, n) = 1 if and only if PrR1 (pϕq) holds”.
Proof. We proceed in PA. Let m, n and V be as indicated in the statement.
Let ϕ be any formula.
(⇒): Suppose e(ϕ, V, n) = 1. If ¬ϕ ∈ Fn, then V (¬ϕ) = 1 − V (ϕ) =
1 − e(ϕ, V, n) = 0. Therefore ¬ϕ is not in PT,m−1 because V is a model of
PT,m−1. If ¬ϕ /∈ Fn, then ¬ϕ is not in PT,m−1 because n = d(PT,m−1). In
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either case, ¬ϕ is not in PT,m−1. Hence ¬ϕ is not in {g1(0), . . . , g1(m − 1)}
because the construction of g1 executes Procedure 1 before Stage 1.m.
Let ϕ = ξk. Then ¬ϕ is not in {g1(m), . . . , g1(m+k)} because ¬ϕ is neither
−ξk′ nor ¬ξk′′ for all k
′ ≤ k and k′′ < k. If ϕ is not of the form ¬ψ, then
g1(m+ k) = −ϕ = ϕ because e(ξk, V, n) = 1. If ϕ is of the form ¬ξl, then l < k
and g1(m + l) = ¬ξl = ϕ because e(ξl, V, n) = 0. Therefore Pr
R
1 (pϕq) holds in
either case.
(⇐): Suppose e(ϕ, V, n) = 0. Then ϕ /∈ {g1(0), . . . , g1(m− 1)} because n =
d(PT,m−1) and V is a model of PT,m−1. Let ϕ = ξk, then g1(m+k) = ¬ξk = ¬ϕ.
If ϕ is not of the form ¬ψ, then ϕ /∈ {g1(m), . . . , g1(m + k − 1)} because ϕ is
neither −ξk′ nor ¬ξk′ for all k
′ < k. If ϕ is of the form ¬ξl for some l < k, then
ϕ is neither −ξl′ nor ¬ξl′ for all l
′ < l. Since e(ξl, V, n) = 1 − e(ϕ, V, n) = 1,
g1(m+ l) = −ξl 6= ϕ. Hence we have ϕ /∈ {g1(m), . . . , g1(m+ k − 1)}. In either
case, PrR1 (pϕq) does not hold.
Claim 2. PA ⊢ ∀x∀y(PrR1 (x→˙y)→ (Pr
R
1 (x)→ Pr
R
1 (y))).
Proof. Since PA+∀uSat(u) ⊢ ConT by Lemma 4.7, PA+∀uSat(u) ⊢ ∀x(ProvT (x)↔
PrR1 (x)) easily follows from the definition of g1. Then D2
G for ProvT (x) implies
PA+ ∀uSat(u) ⊢ ∀x∀y(PrR1 (x→˙y)→ (Pr
R
1 (x)→ Pr
R
1 (y))).
We proceed in PA + ∃u¬Sat(u): Let n and V be as above. Let ϕ and ψ be
any formulas with PrR1 (pϕ → ψq) and Pr
R
1 (pϕq) hold. Then e(ϕ → ψ, V, n) =
e(ϕ, V, n) = 1 by Claim 1. We have e(ψ, V, n) = 1 and hence PrR1 (pψq) holds
by Claim 1 again. We have shown that the theory PA+ ∃u¬Sat(u) also proves
∀x∀y(PrR1 (x→˙y)→ (Pr
R
1 (x)→ Pr
R
1 (y))).
Claim 3. PA ⊢ ∀x(True∆0(x)→ Pr
R
1 (x)).
Proof. As in the proof of Claim 2, ∆0C
G for ProvT (x) implies PA+∀uSat(u) ⊢
∀x(True∆0(x)→ Pr
R
1 (x)).
We work in PA + ∃u¬Sat(u): Let n and V be as above. First, we prove by
induction on the construction of ϕ ∈ ∆0 that for all ∆0 sentences ϕ, ϕ is true
if and only if e(ϕ, V, n) = 1.
• (Base Case): ϕ is an atomic sentence or a universal sentence:
(⇒): Suppose that ϕ is true. If ϕ /∈ Fn, then e(ϕ, V, n) = 1 by the
definition of e. If ϕ ∈ Fn, then V (ϕ) = 1 by the condition (B). Hence
e(ϕ, V, n) = 1.
The proof for (⇐) is similar.
• Induction cases are straightforward by the definition of e.
Let ϕ be any true ∆0 sentence. Then e(ϕ, V, n) = 1 as shown above. By
Claim 1, PrR1 (pϕq) holds. We have shown PA + ∃u¬Sat(u) ⊢ ∀x(True∆0(x) →
PrR1 (x)).
Claim 4. PA ⊢ ∀x(PrR1 (x)→ ¬Pr
R
1 (¬˙x)).
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Proof. Since ConT is equivalent to ∀x(PrT (x) → ¬PrT (¬˙x)), PA + ∀uSat(u) ⊢
∀x(PrR1 (x)→ ¬Pr
R
1 (¬˙x)) by Lemma 4.7.
We reason in PA+ ∃u¬Sat(u): Let n and V be as above. Suppose PrR1 (pϕq)
holds for a formula ϕ. Then e(ϕ, V, n) = 1 by Claim 1. Since e(¬ϕ, V, n) =
1− e(ϕ, V, n) = 0, PrR1 (p¬ϕq) does not hold by Claim 1 again.
This completes our proof of Theorem 4.1.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.2. There exists a Rosser provability predicate PrR2 (x) of T satisfy-
ing the following conditions:
1. T ⊢ PrR2 (p∀~xϕ(~x)q)→ ∀~xPr
R
2 (pϕ(~˙x)q) for any formula ϕ(~x).
2. T ⊢ PrR2 (pϕ → ψq) → (Pr
R
2 (pϕq) → Pr
R
2 (pψq)) for any formulas ϕ and
ψ.
3. PA ⊢ ∀x(True∆0(x)→ Pr
R
2 (x)).
Proof. The definition of our PA-provably recursive function g2 corresponding
to this theorem is different from the definition of the function g1 in our proof
of Theorem 4.1 only for Procedure 2. We describe only Procedure 2 of the
definition of the function g2.
Procedure 2. Sat(m− 1) holds but Sat(m) does not hold.
Let n = d(PT,m−1) and let V be the least model of PT,m−1 satisfying the
conditions (A) and (B).
We say a formula ϕ is critical if ϕ satisfies one of the following conditions:
1. ϕ ∈ Fn and V (ϕ) = 1;
2. ϕ /∈ Fn and ϕ is a true ∆0 sentence;
3. ϕ /∈ Fn and there exists a formula ψ ∈ Fn such that ϕ is an instance of ψ
and V (ψ) = 1.
Notice that if ϕ ∈ Fn, then ϕ is critical if and only if V (ϕ) = 1.
Let {ξk}k∈ω be the effective enumeration of all formulas as above. We si-
multaneously define the values g2(m + k) for k ≥ 0 and a sequence {ik}k∈ω of
numbers as follows: Let i0 = 0.
1. If ξk is not critical and ¬ξk is critical, then let g2(m+ ik) = ¬ξk, g2(m+
ik + 1) = ξk and ik+1 = ik + 2.
2. Otherwise, let g2(m+ ik) = ξk and ik+1 = ik + 1.
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The definition of g2 is finished. As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, it can be
shown that Prf2(x, y) is a proof predicate of T , and we omit the proof.
Claim 1. The following sentence is provable in PA: “Let m be the least
number such that Sat(m) does not hold, let n be d(PT,m−1) and let V be the least
model of PT,m−1 satisfying the conditions (A) and (B). Then for any formula
ϕ,
1. if ϕ is critical, then PrR2 (pϕq) holds,
2. and if ¬ϕ ∈ Fn and ¬ϕ is critical, then Pr
R
2 (pϕq) does not hold”.
Proof. We procced in PA. Let m, n and V be as indicated in the statement.
Let ϕ be any formula. Then for some k, ϕ is ξk.
1. Suppose ξk is critical. First, we prove that ¬ξk is not in {g2(0), . . . , g2(m−
1)}. If ξk ∈ Fn, then V (ξk) = 1, and thus ¬ξk is not in PT,m−1 because V is
a model of PT,m−1. If ξk /∈ Fn, then ¬ξk /∈ PT,m−1 because n = d(PT,m−1).
In either case, ¬ξk /∈ PT,m−1. Therefore ¬ξk /∈ {g2(0), . . . , g2(m − 1)}. By the
definition of g2, ¬ξk is also not in {g2(m), . . . , g2(m+ ik)}. Since ξk is critical,
g2(m+ ik) = ξk. Hence Pr
R
2 (pξkq) holds.
2. Suppose ¬ξk ∈ Fn and ¬ξk is critical. Then V (¬ξk) = 1. Thus
ξk ∈ Fn and V (ξk) = 0. It follows that ξk is not critical. Also ξk is not in
PT,m−1 nor {g2(0), . . . , g2(m − 1)}. Even if ξk is of the form ¬ψ, ξk is not in
{g2(m), . . . , g2(m+ ik − 1)} because ξk is not critical. Since g2(m+ ik) = ¬ξk,
PrR2 (pξkq) does not hold.
Claim 2. T ⊢ PrR2 (p∀~xϕ(~x)q)→ ∀~xPr
R
2 (pϕ(~˙x)q) for any formula ϕ(~x).
Proof. Let ϕ(~x) be any formula. As in our proof of Theorem 4.1, it suffices to
show that the sentence is provable in T+∃u¬Sat(u). We reason in T+∃u¬Sat(u).
Let n and V be as above. Notice that n is larger than the Go¨del number of
the formula ¬∀~xϕ(~x) by Lemma 4.8. Suppose PrR2 (p∀~xϕ(~x)q) holds. Since
¬∀~xϕ(~x) ∈ Fn, ¬∀~xϕ(~x) is not critical by Claim 1. Then V (¬∀~xϕ(~x)) 6= 1, and
hence V (∀~xϕ(~x)) = 1. Let ϕ(~a) be any instance of ∀~xϕ(~x). If ϕ(~a) ∈ Fn, then
V (ϕ(~a)) = 1 by the condition (A). Thus ϕ(~a) is critical. If ϕ(~a) /∈ Fn, then ϕ(~a)
is also critical because V (∀~xϕ(~x)) = 1. In either case, ϕ(~a) is critical. Then
PrR2 (pϕ(~a)q) holds by Claim 1.
Claim 3. T ⊢ PrR2 (pϕ→ ψq)→ (Pr
R
2 (pϕq)→ Pr
R
2 (pψq)) for any formulas
ϕ and ψ.
Proof. Let ϕ and ψ be any formulas. We work in T + ∃u¬Sat(u). Let n and
V be as above. Notice that n is larger than the Go¨del numbers of the formulas
¬ϕ and ¬(ϕ→ ψ) by Lemma 4.8. Suppose PrR2 (pϕ→ ψq) and Pr
R
2 (pϕq) hold.
Since ¬(ϕ→ ψ) and ¬ϕ are in Fn, these sentences are not critical by Claim 1.
Then V (¬(ϕ → ψ)) 6= 1 and V (¬ϕ) 6= 1. Thus V (ϕ → ψ) = V (ϕ) = 1. Hence
V (ψ) = 1 and ψ is critical. Therefore PrR2 (pψq) holds by Claim 1.
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Claim 4. PA ⊢ ∀x(True∆0(x)→ Pr
R
2 (x)).
Proof. We proceed in PA+ ∃u¬Sat(u). Let n and V be as above. Let ϕ be any
true ∆0 sentence. If ϕ ∈ Fn, then V (ϕ) = 1 by the condition (B). Thus ϕ is
critical. If ϕ /∈ Fn, then ϕ is critical because ϕ is a true ∆0 sentence. In either
case, ϕ is critical. Therefore we have PrR2 (pϕq) by Claim 1.
This completes our proof of Theorem 4.2.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 4.3
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 4.3. Before proving the theorem, for each
natural number m, we recursively define the sequence {Xm,n}n∈ω of finite sets
of negated formulas as follows:
1. Xm,0 := {¬ϕ : ¬ϕ ∈ PT,m}.
2. ¬ϕ ∈ Xm,n+1 if and only if at least one of the following conditions holds:
• ¬ϕ ∈ Fm and for some instance ϕ
′ of ϕ, ¬ϕ′ ∈ Xm,n.
• There is a formula ψ such that ¬ψ ∈ Xm,n and ¬ψ → ¬ϕ ∈ PT,m.
Let Xm :=
⋃
n∈ωXm,n.
Lemma 4.9. Let ϕ be any formula and m be any natural number.
1. If ϕ ∈ Xm, then ϕ is provable in T .
2. Xm ⊆ Xm+1.
3. Xm ⊆ Fm. As a consequence, Xm =
⋃
n≤|Fm|
Xm,n where |Fm| is the
number of elements of the finite set Fm.
Proof. 1. We prove by induction on n that for any n ∈ ω, if ¬ϕ ∈ Xm,n, then
¬ϕ is provable in T .
• If ¬ϕ ∈ Xm,0, then ¬ϕ ∈ PT,m and hence ¬ϕ is provable in T .
• Assume that the statement is true for n. Suppose ¬ϕ ∈ Xm,n+1. If
¬ϕ′ ∈ Xm,n for some instance ϕ
′ of ϕ, then ¬ϕ′ is T -provable by induction
hypothesis. Since ϕ→ ϕ′ is logically valid, ¬ϕ is also provable in T .
If there is a formula ψ such that ¬ψ ∈ Xm,n and ¬ψ → ¬ϕ ∈ PT,m,
then ¬ψ is provable in T by induction hypothesis. Since ¬ψ → ¬ϕ is
T -provable, ¬ϕ is also T -provable.
2. We prove Xm,n ⊆ Xm+1,n for all n ∈ ω by induction on n. The n = 0
case is immediate from PT,m ⊆ PT,m+1. Assume Xm,n ⊆ Xm+1,n. Suppose
¬ϕ ∈ Xm,n+1. If ¬ϕ ∈ Fm and ¬ϕ
′ ∈ Xm,n for some instance ϕ
′ of ϕ, then
¬ϕ ∈ Fm+1 and ¬ϕ
′ ∈ Xm+1,n, and hence ¬ϕ ∈ Xm+1,n+1.
If there is a formula ψ such that ¬ψ ∈ Xm,n and ¬ψ → ¬ϕ ∈ PT,m, then
¬ϕ ∈ Xm+1,n+1 because ¬ψ ∈ Xm+1,n and ¬ψ → ¬ϕ ∈ PT,m+1.
3. This is proved by induction and by using the fact PT,m ⊆ Fm.
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Notice that Lemma 4.9 is formalizable in PA. Also notice that there is a
PA-provably recursive computation calculating Xm from m.
Here we give our proof of Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.3. There exists a Rosser provability predicate PrR3 (x) of T satisfy-
ing the following conditions:
1. T ⊢ PrR3 (p∀~xϕ(~x)q)→ ∀~xPr
R
3 (pϕ(~˙x)q) for any formula ϕ(~x).
2. For any formulas ϕ and ψ, if T ⊢ ϕ → ψ, then T ⊢ PrR3 (pϕq) →
PrR3 (pψq).
3. PA ⊢ ∀x(PrR3 (x)→ Pr
R
3 (pPr
R
3 (x˙)q)).
4. PA ⊢ ∀x(True∆0(x)→ Pr
R
3 (x)).
Proof. We define a PA-provably recursive function g3 corresponding to this the-
orem in stages. In the definition, as in Guaspari and Solovay [6], the bell which
plays a role of a flag is prepared. As in our proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, the
construction of g3 consists of Procedures 1 and 2, and the bell may ring during
the execution of Procedure 1. When the bell rings, the construction switches to
Procedure 2. Also in the definition of the function g3, we can use the formula
PrR3 (x) by the recursion theorem.
Procedure 1.
Stage 1.m:
• If there exists some formula ϕ satisfying at least one of the following
conditions, then ring the bell and go to Procedure 2:
1. Xm ∪ PT,m contains both ϕ and ¬ϕ;
2. ¬ϕ /∈ Xm and ¬Pr
R
3 (pϕq) ∈ Xm;
3. ϕ is a true ∆0 sentence and ¬ϕ ∈ Xm.
• Otherwise,
g3(m) =
{
ϕ if m is a proof of ϕ in T,
0 m is not a proof of any formula in T.
Go to Stage 1.(m+ 1).
Procedure 2.
The bell rings at Stage 1.m. Let χ0, . . . , χk−1 be a list of all elements of the
finite set Xm−1. For i < k, let
g3(m+ i) = χi.
After that, let {ξi}i∈ω be the effective enumeration of all formulas introduced
in Section 2. For i ≥ 0, let
g3(m+ k + i) = ξi.
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Our definition of the function g3 has just been completed. The following
claim shows up an important feature of the construction of the function g3.
Claim 1. The following statement is provable in PA: “If the bell rings at
Stage 1.m, then for any formula ϕ,
¬ϕ ∈ Xm−1 if and only if ¬Pr
R
3 (pϕq) holds”. (1)
Proof. We work in PA: Suppose that the bell rings at Stage 1.m.
(⇒): Suppose ¬ϕ ∈ Xm−1. Then ¬ϕ is χi for some i < k where k = |Xm−1|.
Also g3(m + i) = ¬ϕ by the definition of g3. If ϕ were in Xm−1 ∪ PT,m−1,
then the bell would ring before Stage 1.m, and this contradicts the choice of
m. Thus ϕ /∈ Xm−1 ∪ PT,m−1. Then ϕ is not in the list g3(0), . . . , g3(m −
1), g3(m), . . . , g3(m+ k − 1). Therefore ¬Pr
R
3 (pϕq) holds.
(⇐): We prove the contrapositive. Suppose ¬ϕ /∈ Xm−1. In particular,
¬ϕ /∈ Xm−1,0 and hence ¬ϕ /∈ PT,m−1. Let i and j be such that ξi is ϕ and ξj is
¬ϕ. Then g3(m+k+i) = ϕ and g3(m+k+j) = ¬ϕ. Since ¬ϕ /∈ Xm−1∪PT,m−1,
¬ϕ does not appear in g3(0), . . . , g3(m+k+j−1). Since ξi is a proper subformula
of ξj , we have i < j. It follows that Pr
R
3 (pϕq) holds.
Claim 2. PA ⊢“the bell rings” ↔ ¬ConT .
Proof. We reason in PA:
(→): Suppose that the bell rings at Stage 1.m. We distinguish the following
three cases.
• Xm ∪ PT,m contains both ϕ and ¬ϕ: By Lemma 4.9, both ϕ and ¬ϕ are
provable in T . Then T is inconsistent.
• ¬ϕ /∈ Xm and ¬Pr
R
3 (pϕq) ∈ Xm: By Lemma 4.9, ¬Pr
R
3 (pϕq) is provable
in T . On the other hand, since ¬ϕ /∈ Xm−1 by Lemma 4.9, Pr
R
3 (pϕq) holds
by Claim 1. Then PrR3 (pϕq) is provable because it is a true Σ1 sentence.
Therefore T is inconsistent.
• ϕ is a true ∆0 sentence and ¬ϕ ∈ Xm: Then ϕ is provable in T by
∆0C
G for ProvT (x). Also by Lemma 4.9, ¬ϕ is provable in T . Hence T
is inconsistent.
(←): If T is inconsistent, then for some m and ϕ, PT,m contains both ϕ and
¬ϕ. Then the bell rings at some stage.
Claim 3. For any natural number n, T proves “If the bell rings at Stage
1.m, then m is larger than n”.
Proof. Let n be any natural number. We discuss in T . Suppose that the bell
rings at Stage 1.m for some m ≤ n. Then from our proof of Claim 2, there are
formulas ϕ, ¬ϕ ∈ Fn such that both ϕ and ¬ϕ are T -provable. Thus PT,n is
inconsistent. This contradicts the reflexiveness of T .
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Our formula Prf3(x, y) is a proof predicate of T .
Claim 4.
1. PA ⊢ ∀x(ProvT (x)↔ ∃yPrf3(x, y)).
2. For any n ∈ ω and formula ϕ, N |= ProofT (pϕq, n)↔ Prf3(pϕq, n).
Proof. 1. In the theory PA + ¬“the bell rings”, ∀x(ProvT (x) ↔ ∃yPrf3(x, y))
holds by the definition of g3.
In PA+“the bell rings”, g3 outputs all formulas, and T proves all formulas
by Claim 2. Thus ∀x(ProvT (x)↔ ∃yPrf3(x, y)) also holds.
2. Since N |= ¬“the bell rings” by Claim 2, we obtain N |= ProofT (pϕq, n)↔
Prf3(pϕq, n) holds for any n ∈ ω and formula ϕ by the definition of g3.
Claim 5. PA ⊢ ∀x(PrR3 (x)→ Pr
R
3 (pPr
R
3 (x˙)q)).
Proof. We work in PA: First, suppose that the bell never rings. Then T is con-
sistent by Claim 2. Assume that PrR3 (pϕq) holds. Since Pr
R
3 (pϕq) is a Σ1 sen-
tence, PrR3 (pϕq) is provable in T , and hence Pr
R
3 (pϕq) ∈ PT,m for some m. By
the consistency of T , we have ¬PrR3 (pϕq) /∈ PT,m. Therefore Pr
R
3 (pPr
R
3 (pϕq)q)
holds by the definition of g3. We have proved that ¬“the bell rings” implies
∀x(PrR3 (x)→ Pr
R
3 (pPr
R
3 (x˙)q)).
Secondly, we assume that the bell rings at Stage 1.m. Suppose ¬PrR3 (pPr
R
3 (pϕq)q)
holds. By Claim 1, ¬PrR3 (pϕq) ∈ Xm−1. If ¬ϕ /∈ Xm−1, then the bell rings
before Stage 1.m. This is a contradiction. Thus ¬ϕ ∈ Xm−1. By Claim 1 again,
¬PrR3 (pϕq) holds.
We have proved that ∀x(PrR3 (x)→ Pr
R
3 (pPr
R
3 (x˙)q)) is also implied by the as-
sumption “the bell rings”. Thus we conclude that ∀x(PrR3 (x)→ Pr
R
3 (pPr
R
3 (x˙)q))
holds.
Claim 6. T ⊢ PrR3 (p∀~xϕ(~x)q)→ ∀~xPr
R
3 (pϕ(~˙x)q) for any formula ϕ(~x).
Proof. We reason in T : As in our proof of Claim 5, it suffices to prove the
sentence under the assumption “the bell rings”. We assume that the bell
rings at Stage 1.m. Suppose ¬PrR3 (pϕ(~a)q) for some ~a. Then by Claim 1,
¬ϕ(~a) ∈ Xm−1, and hence ¬ϕ(~a) ∈ Xm−1,n for some n ≤ |Fm−1| by Lemma
4.9. Since ϕ(~a) is an instance of ∀~xϕ(~x) and ¬∀~xϕ(~x) ∈ Fm−1 by Claim 3,
we have ¬∀~xϕ(~x) ∈ Xm−1,n+1 ⊆ Xm−1. Therefore ¬Pr
R
3 (p∀~xϕ(~x)q) holds by
Claim 1 again.
Claim 7. If T ⊢ ϕ→ ψ, then T ⊢ PrR3 (pϕq)→ Pr
R
3 (pψq) for any formulas
ϕ and ψ.
Proof. Suppose T ⊢ ϕ → ψ. Then T ⊢ ¬ψ → ¬ϕ. It suffices to show that the
sentence PrR3 (pϕq)→ Pr
R
3 (pψq) is provable in T+“the bell rings”.
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We reason in T+“the bell rings”: Suppose that the bell rings at Stage 1.m
and that ¬PrR3 (pψq) holds. Then by Claim 1, ¬ψ ∈ Xm−1. Thus ¬ψ ∈ Xm−1,n
for some n ≤ |Fm−1| by Lemma 4.9. Let k be the least proof of ¬ψ → ¬ϕ in
T . Then k ≤ m− 1 by Claim 3 (because k is standard), and hence ¬ψ → ¬ϕ ∈
PT,m−1. We obtain ¬ϕ ∈ Xm−1,n+1 ⊆ Xm−1. Therefore ¬Pr
R
3 (pϕq) holds by
Claim 1.
Claim 8. PA ⊢ ∀x(True∆0(x)→ Pr
R
3 (x)).
Proof. We proceed in PA+ “the bell rings”: Assume that the bell rings at Stage
1.m. Let ϕ be any true ∆0 sentence. If ¬ϕ ∈ Xm−1, then the bell rings before
Stage 1.m. Thus ¬ϕ /∈ Xm−1. By Claim 1, ¬Pr
R
3 (pϕq) does not hold. This
means PrR3 (pϕq) holds.
Our proof of Theorem 4.3 is completed.
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